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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the ﬁnancialisation of the university, and how it is possible that 
universities behave as if they were private corporations despite legally being corporations 
with a charitable status. We argue that this is largely attributable to ﬁnancialisation, which 
creates tension with the university’s charitable status. The paper commences with a brief 
history of incorporation, and examines developments in corporate governance. With the 
dominance of ﬁnance, and the treatment of institutions as mere nexus of contracts, 
distinctions between public and private become redundant. The paper continues with an 
account of the effects of ﬁnancialisation on university governance, under which the 
university acts increasingly like a for-proﬁt corporation, with its ﬁnancial governance in 
direct contradiction to its charitable status. Here, the university emerges as a key site of 
neoliberalism, where ﬁnancialised subjects are shaped. Finally, we examine to what extent 
the ﬁnancialisation of the university may be halted through a reﬂection on its status as a 
charitable corporation. 
1.	Introduction	
The	announcement	of	the	founding	of	a	New	College	for	the	Humanities	by	Grayling	in	June	2011	sparked	much	outrage	
in	the	UK	higher	education	sector.	It	arrived	on	the	back	of	a	ﬁerce	struggle	over	the	future	of	universities	in	the	UK,	with	the	
government	succeeding,	despite	student	and	academic	opposition,	in	raising	university	fees	to	£9000	per	annum,	leading	to	
widespread	worry	about	the	sustainability	of	universities.	Hunt	(2011),	general	secretary	of	the	Universities	and	Colleges	
Union,	complained	that	the	New	College	would	further	‘‘entrench	inequality	within	higher	education’’,	and	Eagleton	(2011)	
accused	Grayling	of	‘‘taking	advantage	of	a	crumbling	university	system	to	rake	off	money	from	the	rich’’,	and	surmised	that	
if	there	would	be	more	private	universities	‘‘the	current	crisis	in	universities	will	escalate	into	educational	apartheid’’.	
The	criticism	here	rests	at	least	in	part	on	the	fact	that	the	New	College	is	a	for-proﬁt	corporation	in	the	form	of	a	limited	
company	–	in	contrast	to	all	of	the	existing	universities	in	the	UK	(except	the	University	of	Buckingham),	most	of	which	as	
charities	enjoy	the	status	of	‘‘exempt	charity’’,	meaning	they	do	not	have	to	explain	to	the	Charities	Commission	in	what	way	
they	produce	public	beneﬁt	(CUC,	2009,	p.	38).	At	the	same	time,	by	being	accredited	as	universities	or	university	colleges,	
and	therefore	agreeing	to	certain	governmental	regulations,	they	have	the	right	to	grant	degrees,	charge	student	fees	up	to	  
£9000	(from	2012),	and	are	ﬁnancially	supported	by	the	state.	By	contrast,	the	New	College	shuns	this	bypass	clause,	gives	up	
on	state	funding	and	its	regulatory	implications,	and	concentrates	on	the	custom	of	those	capable	of	spending	£18,000	
annually,	whilst	relying	parasitically	on	the	University	of	London	to	grant	its	graduates	degrees	and	to	provide	basic	facilities	
like	lecture	halls	and	libraries.	
Yet	on	what	grounds	is	this	fury	at	Grayling	and	his	colleagues	based?	Jenkins	(2011)	suggests	that	it	arises	partly	from	
the	fact	that	Grayling	has	caricatured	the	British	university	as	‘‘no	longer	an	academic	community	but	a	high-end	luxury	
consumable	for	the	middle	classes’’.	The	New	College,	in	this	view,	is	an	institution	that	simply	puts	a	mirror	to	the	face	of	the	
British	university	and	what	it	will	become	if	the	recommendations	of	Browne	et	al.	(2010)	and	the	proposed	reforms	(DBIS,	
2011)	are	implemented:	not	a	public	but	a	private	good	traded	in	‘‘a	lightly	regulated	market	in	which	consumer	demand,	in	
the	form	of	student	choice,	is	sovereign	in	determining	what	is	offered	by	service	providers	(i.e.	universities)’’	(Collini,	2010,	
p.	23).	Yet	the	idea	that	‘‘most	not-for-proﬁt	higher	education	institutions	now	operate	in	a	businesslike	manner’’	
(Universities	UK,	2010,	p.	4)	challenges	a	primary	distinction	between	charities	and	for-proﬁt	businesses	and	fudges	the	
traditional	distinction	between	public	and	private	institutions.	Still,	the	distinction	between	public	and	private	has	hardly	
been	explored	in	the	context	of	the	university	(Parker,	2011,	p.	448).	To	respond,	we	will	follow	Calhoun,	by	asking	in	what	
sense	the	university	‘‘is	or	may	be	‘public’:	(1)	where	does	its	money	come	from?	(2)	who	governs?	(3)	who	beneﬁts?	and	(4)	
how	is	knowledge	produced	and	circulated?’’	(2006,	p.	7).	
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We	will	address	these	questions	using	the	institutional	history	of	the	university,	which	demonstrates	that	the	charitable	
status	of	the	university	has	been	problematised,	with	ﬁnancialisation	having	profound	effects	on	university	governance.	We	
ﬁrst	recount	a	brief	history	of	incorporation	to	show	the	problematic	legal	status	of	public	and	private	institutions.	
Incorporation	has	historically	been	bound	up	with	the	notion	of	the	university.	We	argue	that	incorporation	provides	a	legal	
form	connected	to	a	long	history	of	ideas,	informing	conceptions	of	ownership	and	attributions	of	agency	and	rights.	These	
conceptions	were	fundamentally	challenged	by	the	new	theory	of	the	ﬁrm	(Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976),	which	casts	
institutions	as	a	nexus	of	contracts,	and	therefore	reducible	to	economic	agents	contracting.	Since	the	latter	are	conceived	of	
as	homo	economicus	in	neoliberal	discourse	(Foucault,	2008),	the	very	idea	of	charity	is	destabilised,	and	the	legal	status	of	
institutions	becomes	largely	irrelevant	to	their	functioning.	With	the	neoliberal	reshaping	of	the	state	(Harvey,	2005),	these	
economic	logics	have	come	to	dominate	in	the	public	sector,	including	universities.	
This	has	taken	place	against	a	background	of	major	changes	in	corporate	governance	and	management	(Calhoun,	2006,	p.	
15).	With	the	dominance	of	Wall	Street	(Henwood,	1998)	and	the	widespread	primacy	of	shareholder	value,	ﬁnancialised	
logics	have	come	to	dominate.	In	the	second	part	of	this	paper,	we	show	how	this	ﬁnancialisation	privileges	very	particular	
notions	of	ownership,	agency	and	rights,	thereby	changing	the	nature	of	the	corporate	form.	The	nominally	equal	status	of	
the	private	corporation	and	the	university	then	allow	these	logics	to	become	similarly	dominant	in	the	university.	Under	
neoliberalism,	the	distinction	between	public	and	private	is	challenged.	Where	previously	the	welfare	state	might	have	
ﬁnanced	universities	in	support	of	their	public	beneﬁt,	the	neoliberal	state	increasingly	refrains	from	doing	so.	The	university	
must	now	look	elsewhere	for	ﬁnance,	through	loans,	bonds,	or	even	equity,	which	consequently	impose	their	logic	
(Beverungen	et	al.,	2009).	
Here	neoliberalism	as	‘‘the	ﬁnancialisation	of	everything’’	(Harvey,	2005,	p.	33)	emerges	as	the	key	process	with	which	to	
understand	the	contemporary	university.	Complementing	studies	of	the	dominance	of	management	in	the	contemporary	
university	(e.g.	Parker	and	Jary,	1995;	Prichard	and	Willmott,	1997),	this	paper	interrogates	the	dominance	of	management	
in	the	university	today	as	one	consequence	of	ﬁnancialisation,	and	speciﬁes	the	concrete	form	this	dominance	of	
management	takes	through	the	changed	nature	of	ﬁnancial	accounting	in	the	university,	e.g.	in	its	extended	use	of	cost-	and	
proﬁt-centres	(Alexander,	2000).	Extending	work	on	the	commercialisation	or	privatisation	of	the	university	(e.g.	Slaughter	
and	Rhoades,	2004),	a	focus	on	ﬁnancialisation	shows	how	the	university	has	a	central	place	in	reproducing	ﬁnancial	logics	
and	subjectivities	(Parker,	2011).	
The	university	thus	appears	not	merely	as	a	victim	of	ﬁnancialisation,	but	as	one	of	its	main	agents.	In	our	conclusion,	we	
explore	potential	responses	to	these	developments.	The	ﬁrst	is	to	struggle	for	a	take-over	of	the	university	and	its	
governance,	and	to	seek	new	ways	of	governing	the	university	that	resist	ﬁnancial	logics.	This	would	entail	the	construction	
of	common	spaces	within	the	university	that	oppose	the	instrumental	logic	of	ﬁnance.	The	second	is	to	reclaim	the	historical	
attachment	of	the	status	of	the	university	to	the	notion	of	charity.	This	reclaiming	of	the	university	in	the	name	of	charity	is,	
however,	crucially	reliant	upon	a	critique	of	ﬁnance	and	accounting	in	contemporary	university	governance.	
2.	A	brief	history	of	incorporation	
Many	of	the	foundational	texts	of	the	modern	university	(Newman,	1996	[1889];	Kant,	1992	[1798];	Humboldt	
[1809]	in	Mu¨ller,	1990)	rely	on	a	distinction	between	the	activities	of	the	university	and	private	enterprise,	and	
therefore	between	the	university	and	the	private	corporation	as	institutions.	The	university	is	considered	to	be	an	
institution	not	guided	by	the	principles	of	commerce	but	instead	held	together	by	theology	(in	the	case	of	Newman),	
reason	(Kant)	or	culture	(Humboldt)	(see	Readings,	1996).	It	is	an	institution	similar	to	the	church	and/or	the	state,	
rather	than	business.	Yet	in	works	such	as	Newﬁeld	(2003),	a	more	complicated	relationship	emerges	in	which	‘‘the	
research	university	and	the	business	corporation	grew	up	together’’	(2003,	p.	3).	Newﬁeld	drily	notes	that	historians	
‘‘have	been	unable	to	ﬁnd	a	period	in	which	colleges	and	universities	were	fully	in	the	hands	of	educators	who	ignored	
business	input’’	(2003,	p.	21).	
Why	do	universities	ﬁnd	themselves	to	be	so	similar	to	private	corporations?	In	this	section	we	address	this	question	by	
providing	a	brief	history	of	incorporation,	noting	three	different	moments	salient	to	our	analysis.	The	ﬁrst	is	the	emergence	of	
corporations	in	the	13th	century	when	universities	were	a	prime	example	of	institutions	concessioned	by	sovereigns	and	
therefore	fundamentally	public.	The	second	moment	takes	place	in	the	19th	century,	where	corporations	gain	a	private	
character	independent	from	the	state	and	church	and	emerge	as	private	shareholding	corporations.	A	contest	ensues	over	the	
publicness	of	the	corporation,	and	a	case	is	made	for	the	retention	of	the	corporation	as	a	socially	useful	institution	(Berle	and	
Means,	1991	[1932]).	The	third	moment	concerns	the	‘‘neoliberal	revolution’’	(Harvey,	2005),	in	which	ﬁnancialisation	
transforms	the	corporation.	In	this	moment,	the	distinction	between	the	university	and	the	corporation	is	put	into	question	
once	again.	
2.1.	The	universitas	
As	public	institutions,	corporations	are	among	the	oldest	enduring	organisational	forms	in	the	world.	Most	legal	scholars	
see	the	roots	of	incorporation	in	the	concept	of	the	universitas	(Hallis,	1978).	Introduced	in	the	13th	century	by	Pope	Innocent	
IV,	the	universitas	provided	an	understanding	of	institutions	as	political	entities	with	their	‘ownership’	held	externally	by	a	
sovereign	(Timberg,	1946).	This	conditional	model	of	institutions	with	a	public	mission	and	externally	held	political	
ownership	applied	to	every	kind	of	corporation,	even	guilds	and	large	trading	companies,	until	the	early	19th	century	
(Bowman,	1996).	The	universitas	provided	the	means	for	these	emerging	social	institutions	to	be	legally	recognised	and	
therefore	protected	to	allow	for	continuity	separate	from	its	members	–	whilst	simultaneously	allowing	church	and	state	to	
exercise	control	over	these	new	mediators	between	their	power	and	subjects.	
In	the	early	thirteenth	century,	the	ﬁrst	universities	emerged	in	Paris,	Bologna	and	Oxford,	among	others	(see	Rashdall,	
1895).	At	the	time,	ﬁrst	in	Paris,	groups	of	scholars	sought	to	establish	themselves	independently	of	the	state	and	church.	
It	was	a	matter	of	gaining	‘‘corporate	freedom	from	the	direct	control	of	the	cathedral	chapter	and	the	bishop’’,	and	that	a	
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corporation	could	be	formed	was	a	matter	of	doubt	and	surprise	(Post,	1934,	p.	421).	However,	the	very	idea	and	practice	
of	incorporation	was	still	developing.	Rashdall	suggests	that	four	steps	were	necessary	‘‘to	give	to	mere	customary	
meetings	of	Masters	for	the	initiation	of	new	members	or	similar	purposes	the	character	of	a	deﬁnite	and	legally	
recognized	corporation’’	(1895,	vol.	I,	p.	300):	they	had	to	write	up	their	customs	into	statutes,	had	to	be	able	to	sue	or	be	
sued	as	a	corporation,	had	to	appoint	permanent	common	ofﬁcers	and	use	a	common	seal	(Rashdall,	1895).	The	status	of	
the	University	of	Paris	as	a	universitas	was	only	assured	by	a	Papal	Bull	by	Innocent	IV	in	1245	(Post,	1934,	p.	425).	A	
similar	story	unfolded	at	Oxford,	which	was	granted	the	charter	of	universitas	in	1254,	conﬁrming	its	‘‘immunities,	
liberties,	and	laudable,	ancient	and	rational	customs,	and	approved	and	honest	constitutions’’	(Rashdall,	1895,	vol.	II	
part	II,	p.	367).	
The	universitas,	then,	as	one	of	the	earliest	forms	of	incorporation,	was	a	decidedly	positive	development	that	enabled	the	
emergence	of	the	university	as	an	institution.	There	was	no	question	of	these	institutions	being	private,	since	they	were	very	
closely	controlled	by	the	state	and/or	church,	and	their	status	could	be	revoked	–	and	regularly	was.	Incorporation	produced	
the	kind	of	ambivalent	relationship	to	the	state	–	promising	‘‘academic	freedom’’	yet	turning	the	university	into	a	policy	
instrument	of	the	state	or	church	–	a	condition	also	evident,	for	example,	in	Kant’s	(1992)	struggle	with	the	King	of	Prussia.	
For	the	early	corporation,	there	is	no	distinction	yet	to	be	made	between	private	or	public,	for-proﬁt	or	not-for-proﬁt:	the	
corporation	was	a	notably	political	concession	granted	by	the	state	or	church,	and	was	very	closely	regulated	by	its	charter	
outlining	its	various	activities.	
2.2.	Private	but	soulful	
This	historical	model	of	incorporation	encountered	a	signiﬁcant	shift	in	the	early	19th	century.	Under	the	inﬂuence	of	
waning	sovereign	power,	and	new	notions	of	state	and	citizenship,	the	idea	of	sovereign	ownership	and	control	over	legal	
entities	was	eroded	(Veldman,	2011,	pp.	87–88).	The	dominant	‘aggregate’	view	held	that	the	corporation	was	a	product	of	
free	contracting	among	individual	shareholders,	no	different	from	a	partnership.	The	joint	stock	company	at	the	beginning	of	
the	19th	century	was,	then,	not	so	much	a	completely	different	type	of	legal	entity,	but	rather,	a	special	form	of	the	
partnership	(Ireland,	2003,	p.	458).	Against	this	background,	the	legal	entity	was	increasingly	depicted	as	an	outcome	of	a	
voluntary	agreement	between	individuals.	The	corporation	came	to	be	seen	as	a	matter	of	private	law,	and	states	lost	their	
prerogative	to	withdraw	their	concessions.	The	legal	form	became	generally	accessible	to	private	parties	and	public	parties	
alike	(Bowman,	1996).	
One	of	the	key	developments	here,	this	time	in	the	USA,	was	again	the	case	of	a	university,	speciﬁcally	the	legal	case	
Trustees	of	Dartmouth	College	v.	Woodward	(Trustees	of	Dartmouth	College	v.	Woodward,	17	U.S.	(4	Wheat)	518	(1819)).	In	
Dartmouth	v.	Woodward	the	state	of	New	Hampshire	had	sought	to	take	control	of	Dartmouth	College.	The	college,	however,	
had	been	granted	a	charter	by	the	British	Crown	before	the	American	Revolution.	The	judge	ruled	that	the	charter	‘‘was	not	
dissolved	by	the	Revolution’’,	and	that	the	attempt	of	the	state	to	alter	the	charter	was	‘‘an	act	impairing	the	obligation	of	the	
charter,	and	is	unconstitutional	and	void’’,	since,	according	to	the	US	constitution,	‘‘no	state	shall	make	any	law	impairing	the	
obligation	of	contracts’’.	The	case	further	asserted	that	Dartmouth	was	‘‘a	private,	and	not	a	public,	corporation’’	and	
furthermore	the	fact	that	‘‘a	corporation	(that)	is	established	for	purposes	of	general	charity,	or	for	education	generally	does	
not,	per	se,	make	it	a	public	corporation’’	(see	also	Bratton,	1989,	1504ff.).	
According	to	Newﬁeld,	this	case	‘‘had	an	enormous	impact	on	the	related	histories	of	colleges	and	the	corporation’’	by	
establishing	a	crucial	commonality:	‘‘both	could	be	governed	as	if	they	were	the	private	property	of	their	internally	
appointed	ofﬁcials’’	(2003,	p.	22).	Incorporation,	then,	lost	its	inherent	connection	to	a	public	purpose,	whilst	retaining	
the	attributions	of	perpetuity,	agency,	ownership,	and	rights	to	a	reiﬁed	legal	entity.	This	reiﬁcation	created	an	
anomalous	legal	‘subject’,	as	it	referred	simultaneously	to	the	corporation	as	a	collection	of	individuals	and	as	a	group	in	
itself.	The	most	pragmatic	rationale	for	the	acceptance	of	this	anomalous	legal	entity	was	its	positive	economic	effect	
(Berle	and	Means,	1991	[1932]).	Berle	and	Means’	suggested	way	of	dealing	with	this	oddity	entailed	that	owners	give	up	
some	of	their	rights,	and	managers	place	‘‘the	community	in	a	position	to	demand	that	the	modern	corporation	serve	not	
alone	the	owners	or	the	control	but	all	society’’	(1991	[1932],	pp.	311–312).	This	kind	of	argument	formed	the	
background	of	many	attempts	to	understand	the	corporate	form	as	‘social’,	‘soulful’,	or	‘ethical’.	Thus,	to	cover	up	its	
status	as	neither	fully	public	nor	fully	private,	a	logic	of	charity	was	installed	right	at	the	heart	of	the	corporation	through	
Berle	and	Means’	compromise.	
2.3.	The	neoliberal	revolution	
This	awkward	solution	to	the	corporation’s	anomalous	legal	status	was	challenged	in	the	late	20th	century.	Friedman	
(1970)	characterised	Berle	and	Means’	emphasis	on	the	social	responsibility	of	the	modern	corporation	as	‘‘preaching	pure	
and	unadulterated	socialism’’,	endangering	a	free	society.	For	Friedman,	only	individuals,	not	legal	entities	like	corporations,	
can	have	social	responsibility,	because	these	responsibilities	ascribed	to	a	corporation	can	only	emerge	out	of	a	‘‘political	
mechanism’’	based	on	conformity.	For	Friedman	this	runs	counter	to	free	contractual	relationships	between	individuals	
within	the	realm	of	a	‘‘market	mechanism’’	based	on	free	choice.	The	neoliberal	conception	of	homo	economicus	as	free	to	
contract	sustains	Friedman’s	argument	in	defence	of	‘free’	society	against	the	ascription	of	any	public	mission	or	social	
function	to	the	corporation.	
At	the	same	time,	agency	theorists	(e.g.	Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976;	Fama	and	Jensen,	1983)	argued	that	the	corporation	
was	not	an	emergent	social	entity.	In	agency	theory	and	Jensen	and	Meckling’s	new	theory	of	the	ﬁrm,	all	institutions	are	
reduced	to	a	nexus	of	contracting	individuals.	Through	this	reductionist	approach,	institutional	form	becomes	less	directly	
relevant	and	therefore	essentially	interchangeable.	
It	is	important	to	recognize	that	most	organizations	are	simply	legal	ﬁctions	which	serve	as	a	nexus	for	a	set	of	contracting	
relationships	among	individuals.	This	includes	ﬁrms,	non-proﬁt	institutions	such	as	universities,	hospitals	and	foundations,	
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mutual	organizations	such	as	mutual	savings	banks	and	insurance	companies	and	co-operatives,	some	private	clubs,	and	
even	governmental	bodies	such	as	cities	.	.	.		 (Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976,	p.	310,	original	emphasis)	
This	conception	radically	reduces	the	role	of	any	conception	of	social	relations,	by	refuting	the	existence	of	institutions	
with	insides	and	outsides.	Instead,	what	remains	is	‘‘a	multitude	of	complex	relationships	(i.e.	contracts)	between	the	legal	
ﬁction	(the	ﬁrm)	and	the	owners	of	labor,	material	and	capital	inputs	and	the	consumer	of	outputs’’	(Jensen	and	Meckling,	
1976,	p.	310).	The	only	feature	that	differentiates	the	private	corporation	is	that	it	‘‘is	also	characterized	by	the	existence	of	
divisible	residual	claims	on	the	assets	and	cash	ﬂows	of	the	organization	which	can	generally	be	sold	without	permission	of	
the	other	contracting	individuals’’	(Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976,	p.	311).	Effectively	ignoring	legal	history,	agency	theorists	
imbue	shareholders	with	privileged	access	to	ownership	and	control,	prioritising	their	claims	to	the	corporation	over	all	
other	constituent	groups,	like	citizens	and	workers	(Bratton,	1989;	Ireland,	2009).	
This	conception	of	the	corporation	is	central	to	ﬁnancialisation.	There	are	only	economic	agents	contracting,	and	ﬁnance	
itself	is	thought	of	as	a	contractual	relationship	wherein	a	ﬁnancier	provides	funding,	usually	for	a	return	on	investment.	It	is	
no	wonder,	then,	that	critiques	of	the	ﬁnancialisation	of	the	university	see	changes	in	university	practices	and	governance	
models	in	the	1970s	as	crucial	(Harvey,	2005;	Ross,	2009).	We	argue	that	these	changes	are	directly	related	to	the	
fundamental	reinterpretation	of	the	university	as	an	incorporated	institution	described	above.	Probing	this	reinterpretation	
exposes	how	universities	incorporate	logics	of	ﬁnancialisation.	
3.	Governance	and	the	ﬁnancialisation	of	the	university	
3.1.	University	corporations	
Universities	today	bear	the	mark	of	their	complex	corporate	history.	Whereas	old	universities	like	Oxford	in	the	UK	are	
charities	still	governed	by	their	ancient	charters	and	statutes,	the	new	‘‘post-1992’’	universities	are	all	corporations	with	
charitable	status	(CUC,	2009,	p.	36).	That	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	they	are	absolutely	different	from	the	private	
corporation	originating	in	the	late	19th	century	(Veldman,	2010).	At	least	since	E.P.	Thompson’s	scathing	attack	on	‘‘Warwick	
University	Limited’’	(1970)	universities	in	the	UK	(in	particular	the	enterprising	‘‘red	brick’’	universities	such	as	Warwick)	
have	been	seen	to	increasingly	resemble	private	corporations.	In	the	USA,	despite	Veblen’s	attack	on	businessmen	who	want	
to	turn	the	university	into	‘‘a	corporation	of	learning’’	and	‘‘a	business	concern	dealing	in	standardized	erudition’’	(1993,	p.	
64),	for	Newﬁeld	the	term	‘‘corporate’’	is	largely	redundant	in	describing	the	American	research	university	at	the	turn	of	the	
last	century	(2003,	p.	16).	The	university	mimicked	the	accumulation	imperatives	of	corporations,	bringing	with	it	
governance	‘‘through	bureaucratic	administration,	quantitative	measures,	and	client	demand’’	and	‘‘the	constant	growth	of	
management’’	(Newﬁeld,	2003,	pp.	26–31).  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However,	even	in	the	USA	universities	were	not	business	corporations:	without	proﬁt,	the	universities	could	not	beneﬁt	
from	the	‘‘ﬁnancial	machinery’’	to	fund	their	expansion,	and	therefore	remained	dependent	on	outside	sources	of	funding	
(Newﬁeld,	2003,	pp.	31–33).	What	assured	the	continued	stability	of	the	university,	both	in	the	UK	and	the	USA,	was	the	deal	
it	struck	with	the	state:	in	return	for	public	funding	universities	were	to	fulﬁl	a	public	role	in	enabling	widespread	access	to	
higher	education,	promoting	the	arts	and	sciences,	and	conducting	groundbreaking	research	(Newﬁeld,	2008,	p.	224).	This	
post-war	consensus	as	to	the	role	of	the	university	assured	it	stable	government	funding,	institutionalised	in	the	UK	in	
response	to	the	Robbins	Report	(Collini,	2011).	Hence,	their	charitable	status	was	propped	up	by	government	funding,	and	so	
they	remained	distinct	from	the	private	corporation	in	important	respects.	
3.2.	Neoliberalising	the	university	
The	neoliberal	revolution	further	destabilised	this	relationship.	Neoliberal	government,	according	to	Foucault,	follows	the	
objective	of	‘‘a	general	regulation	of	society	by	the	market’’	in	which	the	state	‘‘has	to	intervene	on	society	so	that	competitive	
mechanisms	can	play	a	regulatory	role	at	every	moment	and	every	point	in	society’’	(2008,	p.	145).	Though	‘‘an	unstable	and	
contradictory	political	form’’	(Harvey,	2005,	p.	64),	we	can	observe	the	process	of	the	neoliberal	state	seizing	hold	of	
university	policy	in	the	UK.	The	funding	cuts	of	1981,	which	challenged	the	ﬁnancial	independence	of	universities	and	their	
perceived	right	to	government	grants,	were	quickly	followed	by	the	Jarratt	Report	of	1985,	which	led	to	budget	devolution	
and	a	greater	emphasis	on	corporate	governance	and	accountability	(Deem,	2004).  
 Whilst accountability here included non-ﬁnancial measures, universities by and large responded by making use of the 
‘‘language of ﬁnance’’ to represent their ﬁnancial performance to grant givers (Gray and Haslam, 1990, p. 64). Gray and 
Haslam note that although universities responded to demands for reporting with an ‘‘air of independence’’, there was an 
overall increase in ﬁnancial disclosure, particularly in terms of an increased incidence of treasurers’ reports and an analysis of 
research grants included in annual statements (1990, pp. 64–67). The ﬁrst research assessments followed swiftly (Willmott, 1995, 1016ff.),
 entrenching ﬁnancial accountability and introducing competition. The 1988 Education Reform Act 
accelerated these changes, precipitating the transformation of universities into versions of their private counterparts 
(Saravanamuthu and Tinker, 2002).	
The	relationship	between	regulatory	changes	and	ﬁnancialisation	demonstrates	this	phenomenon.	After	1988,	the	
University	Grants	Committee	was	replaced	by	the	Universities	Funding	Council	(and	later	the	Higher	Education	Funding	
Councils);	the	latter	was	‘‘not	conceived	as	a	buffer	or	mediating	institution	like	its	predecessor;	rather	than	making	grants	to	
universities	it	[entered]	into	contracts	with	them’’	(Peters,	1992,	p.	125).	Government	policy	enforced	through	funding	
councils	was	henceforth	to	follow	the	neoliberal	logics	of	contracts	and	performance-based	accountability	(Alexander,	
2000).	McGettigan	(2012,	p.	23)	suggests	this	process	will	be	continued	by	planned	reforms	transforming	HEFCE	‘‘from	a	
funder	to	the	chief	regulator’’	of	the	university	sector,	in	charge	of	ensuring	a	healthy	competition	between	providers	striving	
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to	secure	their	slice	of	tuition	fees,	government	grants	and	other	income.	
The	current	government	reforms	of	UK	higher	education	extend	the	neoliberalisation	of	universities	which	commenced	
in	the	1970s,	not	only	in	the	UK	(see	also	Slaughter	and	Rhoades,	2004,	pp.	20–22;	Readings,	1996,	pp.	44–53).	Readings	
(1996)	traces	this	neoliberalisation	through	the	rise	of	the	omnipresent	term	‘‘excellence’’,	which	comes	to	dominate	
universities’	responses	to	demands	for	accountability	in	lieu	of	notions	of	‘‘reason’’	or	‘‘culture’’.	Readings	also	comments	
how	this	notion	of	excellence	permits	‘‘exhaustive	accounting’’,	‘‘brackets	the	question	of	value	in	favor	of	measurement’’,	
and	‘‘replaces	questions	of	accountability	or	responsibility	with	accounting	solutions’’	(Readings,	1996,	pp.	29,	119).	
Accounting	here	operationalises	the	demands	of	ﬁnance,	which	through	its	representatives	‘‘looked	for	ﬁnancial	returns	on	
investments	of	public	and	private	money	alike’’	(Newﬁeld,	2008,	p.	169,161).	
The	introduction	of	‘‘total	quality	management’’	and	the	‘‘balanced	scorecard’’	as	means	of	managing	labour	productivity	
(Lawrence	and	Sharma,	2002)	and	research	audits	as	quantitative	measures	of	research	excellence	(Willmott,	1995),	for	
example,	are	evidence	of	the	way	in	which	universities	increasingly	used	and	were	subject	to	accountability.	These	
developments	were	also	precipitated	by	regulatory	guidance,	for	example	in	the	UK	via	the	Statement	of	Recommended	
Accounting	Practice	(‘‘SORP’’,	the	latest	being	Universities	UK,	2007).	This	establishes	benchmarks	for	ﬁnancial	accounting	on	
the	basis	of	business-like	accruals-based	accounting,	entrenching	a	focus	on	efﬁciency	in	the	allocation	of	resources	and	on	
returns	on	investment	(Parker,	2011).	
3.3.	Governance	by	ﬁnance	
Overall,	the	decline	in	state	funding,	increasing	demands	for	ﬁnancial	accountability,	and	concomitant	changes	in	
accounting	practices	have	left	a	profound	mark	on	university	governance	and	its	representation	in	annual	statements,	
reﬂecting	ﬁnancialisation	in	multiple	ways.	Taking	the	University	of	Oxford	as	an	example,	at	least	three	features	are	striking,	
apart	from	the	corporate	language	being	used	(e.g.	in	referring	to	the	university	as	a	‘‘group’’).	First	is	the	sharp	rise	in	income	
and	its	changing	composition:	proportionately	fewer	grants	by	funding	bodies;	stark	rises	in	income	from	tuition	fees	after	
1998	(when	tuition	fees	were	introduced	in	England)	and	2008	(when	the	cap	was	raised);	and	more	income	sought	from	
other	services	provided	as	well	as	from	investment	(see	Table	1).	
Second	is	the	sharp	rise	in	investments	and	endowments	–	the	latter	in	their	scope	speciﬁc	to	Oxford	and	Cambridge.	
Table	2	shows	that	Fixed	Asset	Investments	for	Oxford	have	increased	ten-fold	in	the	last	ten	years,	whilst	Endowment	Asset 
	
Table	1	
University	of	Oxford	consolidated	income	(in	£million),	and	proportion	of	total	income	(in	%).	
1998	 2007	 2011	
Funding	body	grants	 88.4	(29%)	 179.8	(26%)	 200.3	(22%)	
Academic	fees	and	support	grants	 38.5	(13%)	 94.0	(14%)	 152.7	(17%)	
Research	grants	and	contracts	 114.4	(38%)	 248.2	(37%)	 376.7	(41%)	
Other	income	 41.1	(13%)	 126.2	(19%)	 158.4	(17%)	
Endowment	and	investment	income	 21.6	(7%)	 28.3	(4%)	 31.3	(3%)	
Total	income	 304.7	(100%)	 677.5	(100%)	 919.6	(100%)	
Source:	Financial	Statements	of	the	University	of	Oxford	1998,	2007,	2011.	
Table	2	
University	of	Oxford	consolidated	ﬁxed	and	endowment	asset	investments	(in	£million).	
2001	 2006	 2011	
Fixed	asset	investments	 60.3	 199.5	 691.0	
Endowment	asset	investments	 472.5	 628.8	 856.2	
Source:	Financial	Statements	of	the	University	of	Oxford,	2001,	2006,	2011.	
Table	3	
Subsidiaries.	
Number	 Example	nature	of	activity	 Example	interest	
Wholly	owned	 16	 Oxford	Capital	Fund	(General	Partner)	Ltd	 Investment	management	services	
Oxford	Said	Business	School	Ltd	 Executive	education	
Oxford	University	Trading	Ltd	 General	trading	activities	
Not	wholly	owned	 2	 Oxford	Capital	Fund	LP	 Collective	investment	fund	
Associated	 17	 Oxepi	Ltd	 Commercial	exploitation	of	intellectual	property	
Source:	University	of	Oxford	Financial	Statements,	2011.	
Investment	has	also	nearly	doubled.	Overall,	such	features	not	only	point	to	the	increasing	importance	of	income	from	
investments,	but	also	to	a	serious	vulnerability	in	relation	to	ﬁnancial	markets:	Oxford’s	accounts,	not	surprisingly,	
document	a	sharp	drop	in	the	value	of	investments	and	endowments	after	the	burst	of	the	dot-com	bubble	in	2001	and	the	
ﬁnancial	crisis	of	2008.	
Thirdly,	the	increase	in	the	number	of	subsidiaries	is	remarkable.	Whereas	twenty	years	ago	universities	hardly	owned	
any	subsidiaries,	the	University	of	Oxford	now	has	16	fully	owned	subsidiaries,	concerned	amongst	other	things	with	trading	
activities,	executive	education	and	investment	management.	A	further	17	undertakings	are	concerned	with	the	commercial	
exploitation	of	intellectual	property	(see	Table	3).	
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There	are	also	serious	effects	of	ﬁnancialisation	on	university	governance	and	operations	not	immediately	obvious	from	
such	ﬁnancial	statements.	With	pressure	on	income	and	efﬁciency,	universities	have	been	forced	to	reduce	operating	
expenses.	As	salaries	constitute	the	biggest	expense,	often	still	exceeding	60%	of	expenditure	(McGettigan,	2011a,	p.	3),	
universities	have	focused	on	reducing	these	costs,	e.g.	by	increasing	class	sizes	and	using	temporary	contracts.	Bousquet	
(2008)	traces	the	rise	of	precarious	work	in	universities,	where	global	outsourcing	is	supplemented	with	low	wages	and	
precarious	employment	practices	at	home,	creating	‘‘an	interim	environment	of	job	insecurity,	de-professionalization	and	
ever-eroding	faculty	governance’’	(Ross,	2009,	p.	25),	already	initiated	in	the	UK	in	1988	by	the	abolition	of	academic	tenure	
(Deem,	2004).	
Universities	also	‘‘re-engineer’’	their	assets.	McGettigan	(2011a)	shows	in	the	case	of	Middlesex	University	how	it	‘‘sold	
most	of	its	prime	assets	or	borrowed	heavily	against	them’’	(McGettigan,	2011a,	p.	3)	in	order	to	fund	an	expansion,	mostly	
overseas,	which	it	hoped	would	guarantee	an	increased	income	from	overseas	tuition	and	the	provision	of	additional	
services.	As	a	consequence,	Middlesex’s	balance	sheet	is	now	dominated	by	heavy	investments	in	new	facilities	which	
augmented	an	earlier	debt	burden	to	yield	a	debt	equivalent	to	half	a	year’s	income	(McGettigan,	2011a,	p.	4).	Given	the	
sharp	increases	in	overseas	tuition	income	in	UK	universities,	Middlesex	is	hardly	an	exception:	many	universities	have	
established	subsidiaries	or	franchises	abroad,	effectively	turning	them	into	‘‘transnational	corporations	with	global	offerings	
of	courses’’	(Lawrence	and	Sharma,	2002,	p.	662).	Ross	notes	that	some	of	these	offshore	campuses	look	like	free	trade	zones	
‘‘where	outsourcing	corporations	are	welcomed	with	a	lavish	package	of	tax	holidays,	virtually	free	land,	and	duty-free	
privileges’’	(2009,	p.	27).	
Many	UK	universities,	such	as	Lancaster	and	Manchester,	have	also	pioneered	issuing	bonds	to	fund	investments	
(McGettigan,	2011b).	The	consequences	of	this	–	apart	from	the	high	costs	of	repayment	involved	–	are	that	universities	are	
consequently	forced	to	manage	their	own	credit	rating,	with	vast	repercussions:	accounting	must	now	demonstrate	a	
university’s	ability	to	generate	a	surplus	to	service	repayments,	or	else	it	risks	losing	its	ﬁnancial	autonomy,	as	was	the	case	
with	Lancaster	in	the	late	1990s	(McGettigan,	2011b).	The	case	of	the	University	of	California	perhaps	provides	a	potential  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future	scenario:	the	general	revenue	bonds	it	issued	pledge	future	income	from	tuition	fees	as	a	guarantee	for	bond	
repayments	in	case	of	a	default,	all	in	order	to	improve	its	credit	rating	(McGettigan,	2011c).	
McGettigan	(2012,	p.	23)	suggests	that,	in	addition	to	the	‘‘external’’	privatisation	of	the	university	sector	by	for-proﬁt	
actors	such	as	the	New	College,	these	processes	of	ﬁnancialisation,	aided	by	private	sector	accounting	practices,	constitute	
what	one	may	call	an	‘‘internal’’	privatisation.	Teaching	and	research	become	drastically	reconﬁgured,	and	new	forms	of	
ﬁnancial	accounting	shape	how	all	operations	are	managed	and	accounted	for	(Newﬁeld,	2008,	159ff.).	McGettigan	predicts	
that	certain	universities,	such	as	the	new	post-1992	universities	in	the	UK,	might	start	changing	corporate	form	by	e.g.	
dropping	their	charitable	status	and	becoming	companies	limited	by	shares,	which	would	allow	them	to	raise	equity	and	to	
make	even	wider	use	of	ﬁnancial	instruments	(Newﬁeld,	2008).	Yet	before	such	a	scenario	materialises,	universities	are	not	
only	objects	of	ﬁnancialisation,	but	also	already	agents	in	its	reproduction.	
3.4.	Producing	neoliberal	subjects	
After	the	neoliberals’	targeting	of	universities	as	‘‘centres	of	anti-corporate	and	anti-state	sentiment’’	(Harvey,	2005,	pp.	
40–44),	the	university	has	arguably	become	a	key	actor	in	the	construction	of	neoliberal	consent.	Under	the	new	regime,	
student	debt	changes	its	role	from	‘‘a	mode	of	ﬁnancing’’	to	‘‘a	mode	of	pedagogy’’	(Williams,	2009,	pp.	92–93).	Whereas	
previously	students	beneﬁted	from	exemptions	and	bursaries,	student	debt	in	the	USA	and	in	the	UK	has	come	to	serve	as	a	
tool	for	‘‘market	conscription’’.	Debt	teaches	several	lessons	to	the	student:	that	‘‘higher	education	is	a	consumer	service’’,	
that	studying	is	a	question	of	‘‘career	choice’’	and	that	the	worth	of	a	person	is	measured	‘‘according	to	one’s	ﬁnancial	
position’’.	These	lessons	promote	a	worldview	where	‘‘the	primary	ordering	principle	of	the	world	is	the	capitalist	market’’	
and	wherein	‘‘the	state’s	role	is	to	augment	commerce’’	(Williams,	2009,	pp.	94–96).	
The	model	student	is	increasingly	a	ﬁnancialised	subject,	with	ﬁnancialised	logics	of	investment,	credit	and	debt	bound	
up	with	the	development	of	oneself	(Martin,	2002,	p.	9).	Higher	education	becomes	narrowly	deﬁned	as	a	gateway	to	a	better	
job	and	higher	earnings,	with	student	loans	‘‘a	personal	investment	in	one’s	market	potential	rather	than	a	public	investment	
in	one’s	social	potential’’,	where	consequently	‘‘each	individual	is	a	store	of	human	capital,	and	higher	education	provides	
value	added’’	(Williams,	2009,	p.	92).	Through	the	notion	of	human	capital	‘‘the	productive	capacity	of	the	human	[is]	
conceived	as	capital	itself’’	(Adamson,	2009b,	p.	274),	and	the	university	by	proxy,	as	an	incubator	of	this.	By	representing	
themselves	as	providers	of	‘‘value	added’’,	universities	place	themselves	as	guarantors	between	the	neoliberal	subjects	who	
view	themselves	as	endowed	with	human	capital	and	the	‘market’	that	commodiﬁes,	prices	and	exploits	it.	
The	withdrawal	of	state	funding,	the	introduction	of	corporate-style	ﬁnancial	accounting	(featuring	extended	use	of	cost-	
and	proﬁt-centres)	as	a	response	to	changed	accountability	requirements,	and	the	changed	relation	between	university	and	
students,	all	reﬂected	the	neoliberal	paradigm	(Harvey,	2005;	Lock	and	Lorenz,	2007).	The	‘‘students	at	the	heart	of	the	
system’’	(DBIS,	2011)	become	precisely	the	subjects	dreamt	up	by	the	neoliberals:	the	homo	economicus	in	the	market	as	an	
entrepreneur	of	himself	(Foucault,	2008,	p.	226).	The	university	not	merely	resembles	the	private	corporation,	it	has	become	
integrated	into	the	reproduction	of	ﬁnancialisation.	
4.	Discussion:	charity	versus	ﬁnance	
Whilst	we	have	argued	that	the	ﬁnancialisation	of	the	university	is	apparent,	its	ultimate	consequences	perhaps	are	not.	
One	immediate	consequence,	however,	is	the	undermining	of	the	conception	of	charity	in	the	university.	We	have	outlined	
above	how	ﬁnancialisation	entails	‘‘a	shift	in	the	idea	of	higher	education	from	a	social	to	an	individual	good’’	(Williams,	
2009,	p.	91),	whereby	students	themselves	must	consider	education	as	an	investment	in	their	human	capital	(Adamson,	
2009),	education	is	a	commodity	that	can	be	outsourced	and	sold	expensively	to	eager	populations	at	home	and	abroad	
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(Ross,	2009,	pp.	21–22),	and	research	output	becomes	intellectual	property	yielding	a	ﬁnancial	return	(Newﬁeld,	2008,	p.	
228).	This	undermining	of	the	conception	of	charity	leads	to	a	growing	public	cynicism	regarding	the	university’s	mission.	
Why	pay	for	teaching	and	research	out	of	public	funds	(Calhoun,	2006)?	Why	pay	for	tax	holidays,	virtually	free	land	and	
duty-free	privileges	of	institutions	that	possess	sometimes	enormous	endowments	and	pay	their	executives	exorbitant	
salaries?	
Yet,	paradoxically,	it	is	the	public	as	the	generic	‘taxpayer’,	the	‘principal’	for	accounting	in	the	public	sector,	who	
legitimates	the	pervasive	use	of	the	language	of	ﬁnance	in	the	university	(Brignall	and	Modell,	2000,	p.	282),	by	claiming	
increased	accountability.	It	is	in	the	very	name	of	the	‘‘public	interest’’	that	the	ﬁnancialisation	of	the	university	proceeds,	
and	that	accountability	reduced	to	ﬁnancial	performance	measures	undermines	the	conception	of	charity	in	the	university.	
However,	where	there	is	accountability	and	excellence	(Readings,	1996),	there	are	many	other	actors	who	have	a	stake	in	the	
university	and	its	performance	and	who	can	be	deemed	‘principals’	of	the	university;	these	include	‘the	public’,	students,	
employers,	parents,	graduates,	‘the	government’,	and	so	on	(Brignall	and	Modell,	2000;	Hoecht,	2006,	p.	549;	Lawrence	and	
Sharma,	2002,	p.	671).	With	all	groups	prioritising	different	interests,	the	delivery	of	‘value’	and	the	allocation	of	resources	in	
the	interests	of	one	stakeholder	group	becomes	much	more	problematic.	Accountability	that	does	not	address	these	
stakeholders’	claims	potentially	‘‘prevents	universities	from	carrying	out	their	social	responsibilities’’	(Hoecht,	2006,	p.	542),	
and	undermines	conceptions	of	themselves	as	charities.	
In	practice,	the	university	is	rife	with	such	contradictions.	Managing	a	public	investment	for	university	vice-chancellors	
and	their	ﬁnance	departments	entails	optimising	investment	ﬂows,	taking	advantage	of	the	tax	breaks	on	offer	and	
expanding	operations	so	as	to	beneﬁt	from	charitable	status	and	VAT	exemptions	whilst	supporting	joint	ventures	and	
overseas	operations	(McGettigan,	2012).	The	redeﬁnition	of	the	university’s	constitutional	status	from	‘‘public	trust’’	into	a	
‘‘public	investment’’	(Newﬁeld,	2008,	p.	160)	relies	precisely	on	retaining	the	properties	that	come	with	this	status	and	
pursuing	a	strategy	of	for-proﬁt	accumulation	under	the	banner	of	charity.	The	case	of	the	New	College	for	Humanities	
merely	makes	these	contradictions,	which	are	at	work	in	all	universities,	more	apparent.	At	the	same	time,	the	recent	student	
protests,	from	California,	to	Greece,	to	Chile,	to	the	UK,	and	to	Quebec	demonstrate	that	the	ﬁnancialisation	of	the	university	
has	become	a	political	issue	worthy	of	contestation.	Our	analysis	suggests	that	there	are	two	avenues	this	response	to	
ﬁnancialisation	may	take.	Both	depart	from	the	idea	that	a	notion	of	charity	can	be	recovered	from	the	history	of	the	
university	–	even	if	a	classic	notion	of	the	public	university,	remnants	of	which	we	still	ﬁnd	e.g.	in	Newﬁeld	(2008),	is	no	
longer	tenable.	
A	ﬁrst	response	emphasises	that	the	notion	of	charity	remains	at	the	heart	of	social	collaboration	without	which	the	
university	could	not	function.	Ross	contends	that	universities	cannot	be	run	like	for-proﬁt	corporations,	since	the	
collaboration	that	sustains	them	is	‘‘inimical	or	irreducible,	in	the	long	run,	to	ﬁnancialization	after	the	model	of	the	global	
corporation’’	(2009,	p.	30).	More	precisely,	Hoecht	laments	that	‘‘(.	.	.	 )	the	audit	format	adopted	in	the	UK	introduces	a	one-	
way	accountability’’	which	‘‘instead	of	fostering	trust,	has	high	opportunity	costs	and	may	well	be	detrimental	to	innovative	
teaching	and	learning’’	(2006,	p.	541).	For	Kamola	and	Meyerhoff	(1989),	a	struggle	ensues	wherein	the	‘‘commons’’	–	‘‘those	
things	held	collectively	and	used	according	to	the	non-capitalist	value	practices	of	a	given	group’’	(1989,	p.	6)	–	of	the	
university	must	be	protected	against	ﬁnance.	Engaging	in	these	struggles	involves,	amongst	other	things,	recognising	that	
pedagogy	‘‘can	provide	a	notion	of	educational	responsibility,	of	accountability,	that	is	markedly	at	odds	with	the	logic	of	
accounting’’	prevalent	in	the	university	today	(Readings,	1996,	p.	151).	It	is	worth	asking	what	notions	and	practices	of	
charity	are	produced	in	the	non-ﬁnancialised	commons,	and	to	what	extent	these	could	serve	in	redeﬁning	the	university.	
Whilst	for	some	an	embrace	of	the	‘‘undercommons’’	–	commons	hidden	from	governance	–	of	the	university	entails	a	
withdrawal	from	the	university	as	an	institution,	where	‘‘one	can	only	sneak	into	the	university	and	steal	what	one	can’’	
(Moten	and	Harney,	2004,	p.	101),	our	discussion	suggests	that	such	a	strategy	of	building	commons,	often	against	and	in	
spite	of	the	university	as	an	institution,	should	be	complemented	by	a	second	response:	to	reclaim	the	university.	The	
university	relies	on	a	certain	‘publicness’,	both	in	its	day-to-day	operations	and	in	the	labour	on	which	it	is	built,	and	on	its	
status	as	a	charity	with	a	public	purpose.	This	publicness	is	not	put	into	question,	neither	by	business	nor	society	at	large.	Yet	
this	irreducible	publicness	of	the	university	has	been	undermined	by	ﬁnancialisation,	and	an	institutional	understanding	
that	came	to	resemble	the	private	corporation	in	all	but	name.	Indicative	of	this	is	the	way	in	which	the	public	accountability	
of	universities	is	reduced	to	ﬁnancial	performance	measures,	and	therefore	neglects	questions	of	what	is	produced	in	the	
university	and	whom	it	beneﬁts	(Readings,	1996,	119ff.).	Our	account	of	the	corporate	history	of	the	university	suggests	
ways	to	lay	bare	and	contest	the	deep	contradiction	between	current	corporate-style	ﬁnancial	accounting	within	the	
university	and	its	formally	public	status.	
The	challenge	the	corporate	history	of	the	university	poses	is	to	consider	how	its	charitable	status	might	serve	as	leverage	
against	ﬁnancialisation.	For	much	of	its	history	its	legal	status	has	brought	with	it	a	certain	kind	of	independence	for	the	
university.	What	would	it	take	today	to	regain	some	kind	of	independence	from	ﬁnancialisation?	Our	analysis	suggests	that	
whilst	a	focus	on	building	commons	within	the	university	emphasises	and	strengthens	the	publicness	of	the	university	in	its	
day-to-day	operations,	at	the	level	of	governance	one	strategy	challenging	ﬁnancialisation	could	point	to	the	ways	in	which	
it	undermines	charity.	Developing	this	strategy	may	involve	a	plea	for	a	wider	conception	of	accountability,	which	challenges	
its	reduction	to	ﬁnancial	accountability	(Newﬁeld,	2008;	Readings,	1996).	It	may	also	involve	recovering	earlier	notions	of	
charity	from	the	university’s	history,	and	a	role	of	education	that	is	not	limited	to	producing	human	capital.	In	order	to	
reclaim	the	university	in	the	name	of	charity,	however,	such	a	contestation	would	also	need	to	extend	beyond	the	university	
into	the	neoliberal	state.	
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